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ABSTRACT
Bank regulators recently proposed the most fundamental reforms to U.S.
banking law in decades, yet the value-at-risk statistic—replete with known
deficiencies—remains the basis of the capital adequacy requirement.
Consequently, there exists an unresolved tension in the law: the purpose of the
banking rules is to require riskier financial institutions to hold additional capital,
yet the value-at-risk statistic used to make this assessment induces a perverse
incentive to hold the riskiest securities. Overlaid on this framework is the wide
latitude afforded to banks in designing their value-at-risk models.
This Article explores foreseeable issues with the regulatory reliance on
value-at-risk. Moreover, it details specific problems associated with the design
and implementation of this risk measure in the context of the capital adequacy
requirement.
The analysis draws on empirical data and uses advanced
econometrics to engage these issues with the sophistication used at financial
institutions. The Article introduces a supplemental risk measure that may mitigate
the incentive for banks to hold the riskiest securities, and may allow regulators to
introduce a system of capital surcharges accordingly.
1
“[O]perations for profit should be based not on optimism but on arithmetic.”
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2012, U.S. banking agencies released three notices of proposed
rulemaking and one final rule that collectively represent the most fundamental
change in financial regulation since the introduction of risk-based capital
2
requirements in 1989. The new regulatory landscape will largely resemble the
3
Basel III framework, despite some important differences. The reforms will have
profound implications for the future of banking practices in the U.S. and abroad,
but the effectiveness of the banking rules as a safeguard against future financial
4
crises remains an open question.
At the center of the regulatory debate is the capital adequacy minimum: the
appropriate type and quantity of capital that a bank must hold to be compliant with
5
U.S. law. The purpose of the capital adequacy minimum is to ensure that banks
do not overextend themselves and become unacceptably vulnerable to
6
underperforming loans and macroeconomic shocks. In this way, the capital
adequacy minimum is the amount of ballast necessary to ride out a financial storm.

1

BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR 523 (4th ed. 2003).
See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. B (2012); Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation
of Basel III, Minimum Regulatory Capital Ratios, Capital Adequacy, Transition Provisions, and Prompt
Corrective Action, 77 Fed. Reg. 52,792, (Aug. 30, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 324–25, 362)
[hereinafter Proposed Rules].
3
See Proposed Rules, supra note 2, at 52,792. Among other reforms in connection with bank
capital adequacy minimums, the Basel III framework involves modifying the definition of regulatory
capital, altering the minimum capital ratio, and introducing the capital conservation buffer, the
countercyclical capital buffer, and the Global Systemically Important Bank capital requirement.
4
See generally id.
5
See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. B § 1(a).
6
See generally VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., REGULATING WALL STREET 143‒44 (2010).
2
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At the same time, an excessively burdensome capital adequacy minimum will
curtail lending operations and limit the funds available to corporations that require
7
it for sustained growth.
Since the publication of Basel I, U.S. regulators have embraced a risk-based
approach to the capital adequacy minimum by requiring banks with riskier assets
8
to maintain more capital in order to offset the higher statistical probability of loss.
9
In particular, existing regulations focus primarily on credit risk and market risk.
Credit risk is based on the possibility that the loan counterparty will default on its
10
payment obligations, and market risk is based on the possibility that trading
11
securities will drop in value.
Unfortunately, the proposed reforms leave the market risk rules materially
unaltered with respect to the value-at-risk statistic—the basis of the market risk
calculation—even though it systematically underestimates risk exposure and
12
contributed to the financial crisis.
Even more troubling, present regulations
allow banks to construct their own black box value-at-risk models with few
meaningful restrictions on the underlying statistical assumptions. As a result,
banks enjoy considerable discretion in the implementation choices that ultimately
determine their capital adequacy minimums. Despite this latitude, there is no
requirement to disclose the final algorithm used in these bespoke models. This
lack of visibility seems at odds with Dodd Frank’s call for “improv[ed]
13
accountability and transparency in the financial system . . . .”
This Article asks two important questions: First, how effective is value-atrisk as a capital adequacy measure for trading securities? Second, where are the
points of discretion regarding the underlying statistical assumptions, and how great
is their impact? This Article takes a very hands-on approach to answering these
questions by using empirical data from domestic equity markets, reports from the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and sophisticated econometrics
where appropriate.
The organization of the Article follows the form of the questions. Part I
introduces the conceptual design of value-at-risk and explains its perverse
incentive for banks to overinvest in tail risk. Part I goes on to use empirical data to
demonstrate the discretion that banks enjoy in making favorable statistical
assumptions that influence their capital requirements. Part II spotlights the specific
deficiencies of current regulations in curbing the problematic incentives that arise
when banks construct their own undisclosed value-at-risk models.
Part III of the Article proposes “risktesting” as a regulatory tool intended to
complement existing regulations and mitigate the unresolved incentive for banks to

7

See DOUGLAS J. ELLIOT, A PRIMER ON BANK CAPITAL 22 (2010).
See BASLE COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 8 (1988) [hereinafter BASEL I].
9
See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 1(a) (2012); app. B § 1(a).
10
See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 1(a)(1); BASEL I, supra note 8, at 9–10.
11
12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. B § 2.
12
Joseph Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/01/04/magazine/04risk-t.html?pagewanted=all.
13
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub. L. No.
111–203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010).
8
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overinvest in the riskiest securities. The analysis explains why risktesting is not
vulnerable to the shortcomings of alternative approaches and then develops the
various strengths of risktesting through a worked experiment that simulates the
type of dataset that regulators receive from banks. The introduction of risktesting
as a potential regulatory reform to address the unresolved incentive for banks to
assume excessive risk concentrations is the primary contribution of the Article to
the existing academic literature.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF RISK MEASUREMENT: A STATISTICAL PERSPECTIVE
During the financial crisis, many banks with substantial trading books
sustained large mark-to-market losses that inched them closer to insolvency
14
because they underestimated the market risk of the assets in their trading book.
15
As a result, prominent banks collapsed, others required emergency federal
16
17
funding to remain afloat, and credit markets came to a grinding halt. Failures
in the financial sector spread to the real economy resulting in double-digit
unemployment and negative economic growth. Many critics blamed value-at-risk
18
as an inadequate risk management tool and the cause of a regulatory failure.
The crisis emphasized the need for market risk banks to hold additional
capital in order to protect themselves from the impact of another loss. Bank
regulations require market risk banks—national banks with trading activity on their
19
call report greater than or equal to $1 billion or 10% of total assets on a
consolidated worldwide basis—to hold extra capital because of the potential loss
20
from trading activity.
Therefore, market risk banks have a higher capital
21
adequacy minimum that reflects the value-at-risk of their trading securities.
The concept of risk is foundational to the risk-reward tradeoff of modern
portfolio theory, but it is a difficult notion to quantify. In fact, banks used a
22
number of different statistics before value-at-risk came to predominate. One
23
measure was volatility, defined to be the standard deviation of asset returns.
Volatility is a sensible risk measure because it captures the dispersion of asset
price movements and agrees with the intuition that a smoother, more reliable

14
See, e.g., Mark Landler, Losses at Deutsche Bank Reflect Depth of Credit Crisis, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/business/worldbusiness/29iht-bank.4.12440904.
html; Louise Story, Morgan Stanley Posts $2.36 Billion Loss, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2008), http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/12/18/business/18morgan.html.
15
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 289 (2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
16
See id. at 362–63.
17
Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, J. ECON.
PERSP. Winter 2009, at 77, 85–86, 90.
18
See, e.g., Nocera, supra note 12; see also JORGE MINA & JERRY YI XIAO, RETURN TO RISKMETRICS 73–74 (2001).
19
The call report is the Report of Condition and Income. It is a quarterly report to the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council, which distributes the reports to the regulatory agencies.
The information includes balance sheet and income statement reports.
20
12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. B § 1(b)(1)(i)‒(ii) (2012).
21
See id. § 4(a).
22
See PHILIPPE JORION, VALUE AT RISK 113 (3d ed. 2006).
23
See id. at 76.
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stream of gains is less risky than a process of erratic returns. Still, volatility suffers
from a directionality problem because the occurrence of one large gain has the
same impact on the volatility computation as an equally large loss. In this way,
volatility is not a downside risk measure.
Other common statistics are deficient at the portfolio level because they
24
These calculations use the
cannot aggregate across disparate asset classes.
sensitivity of an asset to a particular risk factor. These sensitivities, however, are
not comparable because they are defined in different units. For instance, there is
no meaningful comparison of interest rate risk of a bond with the beta risk of a
25
stock because they measure different risk sensitivities.
Value-at-risk resolves the directional issue by considering only trading
26
losses. Further, value-at-risk is capable of inputting trading securities across
multiple asset classes and outputting a single measure for the entire portfolio
because it computes risk in terms of dollars regardless of the financial
27
instrument. Still, there is no unique value-at-risk algorithm. Instead, value-atrisk is a statistical concept that leaves wide discretion to market risk banks in
creating their models that in turn form the basis of their capital adequacy
28
requirement.
A. The Design
Market risk banks use the value-at-risk statistic because the gain or loss at
the end of the trading day for a financial asset is probabilistic, meaning that the
29
outcome may take any value along a continuum of potential returns.
Each
potential return realization has its own probability. Even if it is impossible to
determine in advance whether the asset will experience an uptick or downtick in
price, it is still possible to estimate the probabilities associated with these potential
returns.
In general, the observed probabilities for the potential returns form a bell30
shaped curve because smaller gains and losses are more likely than larger ones.
Still, the particular shape of the bell curve differs depending on the risk level
31
associated with the particular asset. For example, a riskier asset may exhibit
32
extreme fluctuations in value. Therefore, the relative probability of extreme
returns will be greater, the relative probability of modest returns will be lower, and
33
the bell curve will have a flatter appearance. By contrast, a more conservative

24
See CAROL ALEXANDER, VALUE-AT-RISK MODELS 5 (2008); see also JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS,
FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 435 (6th ed. 2006).
25
See JORION, supra note 22, at 76; see also HULL, supra note 24, at 76.
26
For this reason, value-at-risk is often called a downside risk metric. See, e.g., ALEXANDER,
supra note 24, at 9.
27
See Thomas J. Linsmeier & Neil D. Pearson, Value at Risk, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.‒Apr. 2000,
at 47, 48; MINA & XIAO, supra note 18, at 66.
28
See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. B § 4 (2012).
29
See JORION, supra note 22, at 79–80.
30
See JORION, supra note 22, at 88.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
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asset will exhibit few extreme fluctuations and will therefore have a tighter, more
34
peaked bell curve representing a greater probability of slight gains and losses.
The value-at-risk statistic involves two steps: First, a model estimates the
probability distribution for the returns of the financial portfolio by fitting an
35
appropriate bell curve. Second, the model identifies the particular return along
36
the continuum that represents the specified percentage cutoff. For example, if
the bank wants to determine the 95% value-at-risk, then the model will identify the
return on the continuum for which the sum of probabilities to the right of that
return total 95%. If the model is accurate, then there is a 95% chance that the
financial portfolio will beat the trading return that the model identified. It is
equivalent to say that there is only a 5% chance that the bank will sustain trading
losses worse than the 95% value-at-risk.
The design of value-at-risk hides potentially catastrophic losses because it is
an ordinal statistic that simply ranks the universe of possible trading outcomes
37
according to their magnitude and probability. Ordinal statistics—such as the
minimum, maximum, median, and percentiles—are useful as high-level descriptive
summaries of a dataset, but are blind to outliers. Consequently, value-at-risk
describes the order of potential returns, but ignores the spacing between successive
38
returns thereby ignoring losses in the tail of the distribution. For example, the
95% value-at-risk identifies the loss for which the sum of probabilities to the right
of that return total 95%. The next potential return beyond this threshold could be
an incrementally larger loss or a catastrophic loss, but value-at-risk is blind to the
difference. For example, the value-at-risk of a portfolio could be a loss of $100
million, and the next worse potential return could be a loss of $101 million. Just as
easily, however, the next worse potential return could be a loss of $200 million.

Figure 1. As an ordinal statistic, value-at-risk looks to the order–not the spacing–of potential asset returns in the
probability distribution of a financial portfolio. As a result, a risky portfolio and a conservative portfolio may have
the same value-at-risk if the catastrophic losses of the risky portfolio are hidden in the tail of the distribution.

In Figure 1, the 95% value-at-risk is identical for both distributions because
the summation of the probability bars starting from the gains side moving leftward

34

Id.
See JORION, supra note 22, at 106‒07.
36
Id.
37
Some academic literature uses the term quantile statistic, but the terms are interchangeable. See
generally id. at 88‒92.
38
See, e.g., HULL, supra note 24, at 436–37.
35
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until reaching 95% identifies the same trading return for both distributions. The
two distributions are identical up to the percentage cutoff, so the value-at-risk is
the same. In this way, value-at-risk hides the catastrophic losses and fails to adjust
the capital adequacy minimum of the risky portfolio.
Table 1. JPMorgan: Value-at-Risk
Primary Market
95%
99%
Risk Category
Cutoﬀ Cutoﬀ Increase
Fixed Income
160
221
Foreign Exchange
18
30
Equities
47
75
Commodities and Other
20
32
Diversiﬁcation
(91)
(131)
Trading Value-at-Risk
154
227
47%
SEC Disclosures. Average One-Day VaR for Year Ended 12/31/09

The 2009 JPMorgan annual report demonstrates how quickly potential losses
beyond the 95% threshold can mount because the value-at-risk for the 99% cutoff
39
is almost 50% greater. This comparison is useful because both value-at-risk
calculations utilize the same estimation techniques, calibration period, and other
model assumptions. An increase of 4% in the percentage cutoff corresponds to an
almost 50% increase in potential trading losses.
Banks face a perverse incentive to overinvest in tail risk in order decrease the
40
value-at-risk of the portfolio and lower their capital adequacy requirements. If,
for example, banks want to express a view of the market, they can lower the valueat-risk calculation by holding extremely risky assets because the potentially
catastrophic losses are hidden deep in the tail of the distribution. Moreover, the
lower reported value-at-risk makes the bank appear to possess a stronger balance
sheet.
A state contingent last period problem occurs if the bank would be unable to
sustain catastrophic losses, so there is no disincentive against holding additional
risk related to that particular source of loss. A last period problem is state
contingent if the losses arise only in a certain state of the world. In the value-atrisk context, the relevant state of the world is a loss in the particular trading
security that the leads to the catastrophic losses. For example, a bank that writes
deep out-of-the-money put options will face losses only if the underlying asset
experiences very extreme, very unlikely losses. If a bank wrote so many options
that it would become insolvent during a payout event, then there is no disincentive
against writing additional options of the same kind. Therefore, banks holding the
most extreme tail risk have the least disincentive not to increase that position.
B. The Implementation
In addition to a regulatory design that incentivizes suboptimal risk exposure,
value-at-risk involves implementation choices about statistical assumptions that

39
40

JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 119, 121 (Feb. 24, 2010).
12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. B, Section 5.
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have important consequences for the overall capital adequacy computation.
Common assumptions introduce a downward bias in risk estimates, so many banks
hold less capital than necessary because managers have a false sense of security in
risk management practices at the bank.
The statistical challenge in quantifying market risk is complex because a
properly specified model must capture the probability distribution of portfolio
assets individually, collectively, and as they evolve over time. The marginal
distribution of individual assets often does not match the symmetry and tails of
theoretical distributions thereby introducing a downward bias in the probability
estimate of extreme losses. Further, the co-movement structure of assets
42
collectively is non-linear and therefore difficult to describe with intuitive models.
Finally, the marginal distribution and co-movement structure are time varying as
43
the broader financial markets transition between periods of stability and distress.
i. Three Value-at-Risk Methodologies
U.S. regulations require market risk banks to add a market risk adjustment to
their capital adequacy requirements by using any of three value-at-risk
44
methodologies: the historical, Monte Carlo, or variance-covariance. Specifically,
market risk banks must use a 99%, one-tailed, ten-day value-at-risk calculation
45
based on a calibration period of at least one year. Banks choose the value-at-risk
methodology based on the asset classes they hold and the complexity of their
hedging strategy.
The most intuitive approach for banks trading stocks, bonds, and other
traditional securities is the historical methodology because it simply replicates the
historical gains and losses that would have resulted from a buy-and-hold strategy
46
of the present portfolio. Moreover, the method makes no assumptions about the
distribution of the assets other than assuming that past returns reflect future
47
returns. It is possible to replicate the historical returns of the portfolio by simply
48
constructing a weighted average of the historical returns of the assets. The
returns of the replicated portfolio form a historical distribution that yields the
49
value-at-risk estimate.
This methodology is unsuitable for illiquid or bespoke securities such as
41
See Tanya Syblo Beder, VAR: Seductive but Dangerous, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.‒Oct. 1995, at
12, 12 (explaining that “[a] review of dozens of dealers’ and end-users’ VARs revealed radically
different approaches to the calculation. . . . [E]ight common VAR methodologies were applied to three
hypothetical portfolios . . . . [T]he magnitude of the discrepancy among these methods is shocking, with
VAR results varying by more than 14 times for the same portfolio. These results illustrate the VAR’s
extreme dependence on parameters, data, assumptions, and methodology.”).
42
See JORION, supra note 22, at 207.
43
See id. at 219.
44
12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. B note 10.
45
12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. B § 4 (d)(1)(2).
46
See Romain Berry, An Overview of Value-at-Risk: Part II—Historical Simulations VaR, J.P.
MORGAN, http://www.jpmorgan.com/tss/General/Risk_Management/1159369485859 (last visited Mar.
18, 2013).
47
See ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 141.
48
See id.
49
See id.
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structured products and over-the-counter derivatives because a long history of
50
reliable prices is often unavailable, especially in thinly traded markets. Many of
these securities exist because of recent financial engineering and therefore lack the
51
financial record necessary to estimate the distribution. Many large banks trade
these sophisticated instruments, so the historical methodology is typically
appropriate only for small banks and traditional asset classes.
Banks trading highly complex financial derivatives often favor the Monte
Carlo methodology because it can estimate value-at-risk even when the payoff
structure of the derivative is too complicated for a direct mathematical
52
computation. The Monte Carlo methodology uses a random number generator to
produce a dataset simulating the distribution of the underlying asset and then feeds
those individual data points into the payoff structure of the derivative one-by53
one. The resulting values form a simulation of the distribution of the derivative,
54
which is the basis for the value-at-risk calculation.
The Monte Carlo methodology is practical for complex derivatives, but
simulations are computationally intensive and generally less helpful for measuring
55
risk exposure and developing hedging strategies. By contrast, a methodology
56
using equations can describe risk exposure more easily. For example, the BlackScholes equation values a call option as a function of the underlying stock price,
57
interest rate, drift, volatility, and time to maturity. Using calculus, it is possible
to isolate the sensitivity of the derivative to adverse changes along any one of those
58
risk dimensions and thereby allow banks to hedge more effectively.
The last permitted approach is the variance-covariance methodology, which
assumes that financial assets individually and collectively follow a particular bellshaped distribution with certain algebraic properties that make the value-at-risk
59
calculation straightforward.
The term “variance-covariance” refers to a
mathematical matrix with statistical estimates for the co-movement of each asset
60
with each other asset. When the matrix is inputted in the mathematical equation,
61
the result is a multivariate distribution describing the entire financial portfolio.
The equations themselves make critical assumptions regarding the distribution of
the assets with important consequences for the value-at-risk estimates.
This Article examines the variance-covariance methodology because of its

50

See id.
See id. at 145.
52
See ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 201; Romain Berry, An Overview of Value-at-Risk: Part
III—Monte Carlo Simulations VaR, http://www.jpmorgan.com/tss/General/Risk_Management/
1159380637650 (last visited Mar. 18, 2013); see, e.g., JORION, supra note 22, at 308.
53
See JORION, supra note 22, at 267.
54
See id.
55
See id.
56
See, e.g., HULL, supra note 24, at 353.
57
See id. at 295.
58
See id. at 241; see also JORION, supra note 22, at 255.
59
See Romain Berry, An Overview of Analytical VaR, J.P.MORGAN, http://www.jpmorgan.com/tss/
General/email/1159360877242 (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).
60
See RICHARD A. JOHNSON & DEAN W. WICHERN, APPLIED MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS 68–70 (6th ed. 2007).
61
Id. at 150.
51
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62

prominence in the financial industry.

ii. The Marginal Distribution
The market risk calculation requires assumptions regarding the marginal
probability distribution, which is the movement of a single random variable such
63
as the returns process of a financial asset. This is the starting point for a more
comprehensive value-at-risk model that describes an entire portfolio of multiple
asset classes. The Gaussian probability distribution is the most common
assumption for the movement of observed returns, but this assumption does not
64
match the heavy tails and asymmetry of the empirical returns. As a result, the
Gaussian distribution underestimates market risk and biases the capital adequacy
minimum to a lower value.

a. The Gaussian Distribution

65

The variance-covariance methodology uses the Gaussian probability
distribution—a mathematical equation describing a family of bell-shaped curves—
66
to model the marginal distribution of financial assets returns. The Gaussian
distribution is a practical choice to describe the marginal distribution because it
67
captures the majority of asset returns. Moreover, the equation is algebraically
tractable and effortlessly extends to higher mathematical dimensions, meaning that
the variance-covariance methodology can describe a portfolio holding any number
68
of financial assets.
It is relatively easy to calculate value-at-risk because only two parameters,
69
the mean and variance, are required to complete the Gaussian equation, or are the
70
parameters computationally intensive to estimate. Perhaps most importantly, the
natural interpretation of the Gaussian parameters comports with the intuition of
traders about the average return and volatility of the asset. For instance, the mean

62

Nocera, supra note 12.
RENÉ A. CARMONA, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL DATA IN S-PLUS 63 (George Casella
et al. eds., 2004).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 35.
63

65

The Univariate Gaussian Distribution:
1
−
e
f (x) = p
2πσ 2
66

(x−μ)2
2σ 2

See MINA & XIAO, supra note 18, at 13.
See MINA & XIAO, supra note 18, at 95–96.
68
See JOHNSON & WICHERN, supra note 60, at 149.
69
DENNIS D. WACKERLY, WILLIAM MENDENHALL III, & RICHARD L. SCHEAFFER, MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS WITH APPLICATIONS 170 (Carolyn Crockett et al. eds., 6th ed. 2002).
70
See, e.g., id. at 372.
67

